

On Pry, War Scare 1999
12/9/15 1:33 PM

[If decapitation could simply **delay** launch of SU missiles, US warheads could destroy...how many?

{Note that capability for an effective **surprise** attack (only) is not good for blackmail, since threat can put opponent on alert. AJW and Roberta R- really were looking at a surprise attack, Pearl Harbor: if SU were to get only this, it must be to use it, not to threaten it. That's what we believed SU wanted, and was trying to get, and would use when it got it.

But that was mistaken. They weren't trying, despite bluffs and demos and threatening talk. (contrary to Horelick and Rush). We totally misread them.

Did either side try to get this? Well, LeMay had it. Yes, tried to get it, after his WWII. (But no two at once: no reciprocal fear, even for LeMay).

Neither side, after 1964, had a good surprise attack capability, ever again. (We didn't, with respect to Europe, even earlier). And attack against an alerted force (say, preemption on tactical warning!) was even worse, much worse.

But the latter (especially on strategic warning) while not at all "good" (in fact, disastrous) was still less bad, potentially, than striking second: allowing a full first strike to arrive (even against one's alerted force).

Enough better to justify preempting on strategic warning (or uncertain tactical warning) if there was still "some chance" of averting the war by other means? No, I would say; USG would almost surely have said (not all military). ("What if 'other means' amount to 'surrender'; meaning, what?)

Military are almost sure to say: Striking first is "better" than striking second, **and better than accepting some less-than-certain probability of being struck first.** (remember, effects of striking first are themselves uncertain, especially against un-alert enemy; somewhat uncertain; what if decapitation actually works, at least to delay reponse (how long? Until our warheads arrive, on missiles? On B-70, B-2?

Or conversely, coercion ("Don't hit our cities, even if we have hit your military targets, because you will lose your cities." (But hitting their "military targets" will almost surely be interpreted as a massive attack on their cities, because it will be: hard to tell from an all-out attack on cities, with some not yet having been hit "by accident.") (Of course, if Moscow itself is still there to receive threat...but can it still control its missiles, with communications blocked? Will it not use its "last remaining moments" to order response? OK, CROSS THAT OUT, from military point of view. (Which does military prefer: "negotiated solution" (what about their real

counter-threats?! or “direct attack on their capabilities...including communications and command.” Ha. See Vietnam.)

KGB saw P-II as CMC in reverse. By decap, it would (might) allow US to “win” the war.

[Why would Andropov think US would attack before buildup was achieved? Before P-II was in place (though some may have come early)? And SDI, if it could be gotten to work? (All this was like Russian buildup in 1914-17; why would Russia attack sooner—unless it was forced, as by Serbia? What would “force” US to attack sooner than it could do so more safely?) Correlation was going against SU, true: a motive for SU to attack (“better now than later”) but ONLY if US was about to attack: otherwise, “now” was still catastrophic, worse than anything except US FS.

SU leaders panicked (opposite of “Bolsheviks,” Leites: realistic, patient, optimistic about future (that had changed). Facing P-II and future SDI (Gordievsky implies: they became irrational, blind to above logic...)

[But CPD believed that SU was about to achieve “superiority,” and some, that it already had “superiority.” Just as irrational. But at least they weren’t striving for preemptive attack! Rather, to “deny Soviets superiority”: by means that faced Soviets with fear of inferiority, decapitation and “useless” ballistic missiles!

Each saw the other’s drive for parity as a drive for superiority (Pry doesn’t criticize CPD for this). They saw themselves going (SU) into permanent crisis, which could erupt into WWII any time. “the prudent course was to look for it sooner.” (But still: could that mean, preventive war without believing that US attack was imminent (incomprehensively)? At this point 8, Pry almost implies this (like Germany, 1914) (Germany was not wrong in believing that Russian counterattack on Austria was imminent! Just on, what to do about that! NOT preempt!)

Yes, this is saying (it seems, rightly) that situation in 1983 (like now!) was like pre-WWI, with focus on preemption (on SU political side; like US military side in late Fifties and early Sixties: how long did this persist? Into Carter and Reagan! Yes! Like WWK (and me, oh dear: damage-limiting, I and McN accepted, thereby not changing force size or posture).

[Was I ever capable of warning the world (not just Congress, in secret) (or American media, if they wouldn’t print it) if I thought nuclear war was imminent?

What would I have done in October 1969 if I had known of the nuclear parts of Duck Hook plans? As it was, I expected nuclear attacks eventually, probably not until 1971-72-73 when DRV finally launched an offensive impatiently. What if I had known in 1969 it was imminent?

Why WAS Carter, and Reagan, preparing for preemption—when it actually made no sense? (As Perry knew, surely) (Didn't Carter?) (And Reagan would hardly have been drawn to it—as we now know. See his reaction to The Day after)

10. SU preferred ICBMs to SLBMs for preemption! (US, too? The argument, for USAF)

11> SU had 60% of warheads on ICBMs, US 80?% on on SLBMs only 20% on ICBMs, retaliatory preference. (? Or Trident CF capability; better control of subs than SU had). (See their problems with their subs).

(Pry doesn't seem to address the USAF preference for preemption, reflected in its planning and forces.

Pry: LOTW (launch on tactical warning) is more risky for SU, relying on ICBMs.

But SU regarded strategic warning as easier to acquire and more reliable than minutes of tactical warning. (!!!) That's their lesson from 1941!

60's 70's

12/10/15 10:10 AM

How could the SU military have seen a big advantage in striking first on strategic warning—"strategic preemption"—in the 80s (or 70s, or 90s, or now)? The retaliatory forces surviving in the US would have assured the destruction of SU society.

The advantage could only relate to "prevailing," "winning." And for that to influence a decision to strike, it would have to be divorced, as a consideration, from "surviving" as a society, or at least, from sudden population loss and massive disorganization of the society (a very broad definition of "surviving"). "We will be largely destroyed, but we will prevail." The "we" here, post-war, would be dramatically different from before the war.

And yet, that definition "prevailed" in the minds of American military and even politicians ("two Americans, one Russian" "If there's two people left on one side [and one on the other,]I want those two to be American." Man and woman? Senator Russell, "frequently.". [President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism, By John Dumbrell, p. 76.

How many warheads would be held back in reserve, with what yield, survivably? Compared to the opponent. First strike made a difference to that, especially for the Soviets (fewer SLBMs).

Especially for that criterion, launching at least thirty minutes before the opponent has launched, thus having one's warheads arrive on enemy sites before the enemy has launched (rather than, after some or most have already launched and are on the way, being detected by tactical warning) makes a big difference: not to survival of one's population (destroyed by the enemy's invulnerable weapons, SLBMs) but to "post-attack balance." Does that matter? It's madness to be concerned about that!

Recall that Pearl Harbor did not remotely threaten defeat for the US. Barbarossa did, for the SU. At the least, enormous cost and prolongation of the war. Question: **(to Tr): What kind of strategic warning did the SU have on Barbarossa? They were warned by Churchill (and US?) and others; but what was Stalin's intelligence service telling him? Is it possible, even, that Barbarossa was covered by a German exercise, that deceived Stalin and perhaps even intelligence? That would account for their great fear of an exercise being cover.**

Both of us were surprised in WWII: but that was almost fatal for one; "convenient" for the other, in getting us into the war both with Japan and with Germany, which was desired and otherwise politically hard to get! (Like 9-11 and Iraq!) NOT to have been attack, and not to have surprised (!) would have been very much less desirable to the leadership. (Like our "surprise" on August 2 and 4, 1964, or attack on Pleiku). (Tet was not helpful: but it could have been, as Wheeler and Westmoreland hoped.) (1972 was not helpful, initially: but ultimately, it was: it got DRV to accept Thieu in office, Nixon's primary requirement for an agreement.)

[this morning thought: Nixon was (still) guarding urgently two secrets about his Vietnam policy, which he thought I threatened. First, his aim, commitment, requirement of his policy: that Thieu remain in office throughout his second term, i.e., as long as he did (which he achieved!); he would leave office with Thieu in Saigon. (Why so fixed on this? Because he owed his election in 1968 to Thieu? (true) and to his own "treasonous" efforts to influence Thieu in October-November? (true) which Thieu might expose? And perhaps he had made an explicit deal with Thieu, at some point, to this effect? (and maybe Thieu had recycled American funding to Nixon, at some point? As Renata Adler believed). At any rate, meeting this criterion was his definition of "leaving with honor."

There is an analogy with Russia's apparent determination to keep Assad in power (as, apparently, they were committed to in 1983, according to an SNIE, with respect to Assad's father! Already, a base in Syria, no?). And for that matter, BHO's curious determination to see Assad go (perhaps both sides lessening just now: or not).

Also, see Reagan's determination to break through ABM Treaty, for SDI testing. Meeting Gorbachev's determination to keep the treaty. Both preferred their "bottom lines" to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons! (Perhaps neither of them thought that was practically achievable, given their militaries! That would be fairly realistic.

Military fears of both JFK and K lost them their jobs. Also, Gorbachev? (Were the JCS afraid of Reagan, after Reykjavik? They might well have been!)

Second, his strategy for assuring this. Threaten the DRV with escalation—including nuclear weapons—if they didn't agree both to letting Thieu stay in office and to mutual withdrawal. With his bombing in 1972 (their offensive having failed to topple Thieu, at great cost), he achieved the first (NOT with his prior threats, including nuclear weapons); he never achieved the second (and had to handle Thieu, in part with the demonstration of the Christmas bombing, to get him to sign an accord without it).

What would actually happened if I HAD had documents exposing either or both of these secrets (as he plausibly feared), and had revealed them? (E.g., either in 1969, or in 1970, or 1971, or at the convention in 1972 in my press conference?) Say, if Tony Lake (or Roger Morris) had responded to my plea? In 1972, after the Wallace shooting in May 8, he would still have won the election: and by that time, probably nothing would have changed, IF the Dean revelations had come out anyway. Or, maybe Congress would have voted the cut-off (even more determinedly) even without the Dean revelations.

Earlier? Hard to say. But Nixon's fears MIGHT have materialized, of mobilizing effective opposition to the policy, getting enough votes for McGovern-Hatfield.

(If I had exposed the nuclear—including the Nixon NSSMs!—well, I would have gone to prison...and Nixon could have justified his crimes against me; effect on arms control? Hard to say.

NOW: it turns out that NOW is like 1983 (a renewed Cold War, conflicts, and arms build-ups of preemptive weapons): and that 1983 was far more dangerous, less stable, than I then believed it to be. (Even though, as TR reminds me of my Irvine lectures, I was then saying that it was less stable than arms controllers thought: The construction of instability.)

Others thought: perfectly stable (since 1963, really). I thought: unstable to (false) tactical warning that went further than it ever has yet, especially during a crisis. And to armed conflict between the SU and US, especially if one uses tactical nuclear weapons. (The SU was more likely to do this than I thought, especially in Europe). And to a possible uprising in East Europe (as, according to Pry, in Poland, 1981).

All this was true. But it was also unstable (with respect to a possible SU FS!) to “strategic warning,” without either the launch or a false alarm of a launch of US weapons, including not only (possibly false) warnings that US forces had gone on high alert (this occurred, according to Pry) but to indicators falsely interpreted (encrypted communications between Reagan and Thatcher over Grenada! AND bases on high alert, right after Beirut, same time, 1983) and incidents like KAL-007 (which the Soviets interpreted falsely as an intelligence mission, even after they knew it was a civilian airliner) and deployment of P-II (“just to ‘balance’ SS-20: but also to compensate, Germans, for reneging on N-bombs: though the P-II created great problems for the Germans, with my participation!).

All this might even have triggered SU FS by itself, together: but even more, it put SU forces on a hair trigger (which we didn’t suspect), making their decision very sensitive to OTHER, adventitious “indicators” (like Petrov’s false computer alarm; or a possible heightening of NATO alert during Able Archer, which Perroots chose not to do; or participation in Able Archer of Reagan and others!

Strategic warning could be almost anything (see Oleg Penkovsky’s “warning”!)—but some things much more than others—and we weren’t alert to these possibilities at all!

I would have thought that the actual “hair trigger” (which I still thought had a heavier action than it did) was just inertia, justifying a continued role for USAF missiles. (Still? Anything else? Damage-limiting, of course: but again, is that more than inertia, ideology, in US? Apparently more in SU: prevailing. Also: “threatening” instability, pretending that system is unstable (either as a bluff: or in reality, it may be!) to caution enemy to tread lightly, lest he set off the alarm system (which blows up the block).

TR: you are what you pretend to be (especially to opponent: who takes measures to counter you, to which you respond in a self-fulfilling prophecy or pretence: **a self-fulfilling pretence**. We pretend to have a capability and readiness for preemption (even though it’s a bluff, because we know that preemption is still disastrous); but opponent does the same, to preempt our preemption (strategically), which makes him prone to false alarms, which triggers our preemption (tactical).

Readiness to preempt on tactical warning (even if you’re determined NOT to preempt at all, especially on strategic warning) **looks the same** to an opponent as readiness to

preempt on strategic warning, or launch “preventive war” (if you’re just afraid, as the VYRAN computer model might indicate, that the “correlation of forces” is going against you, even though that might not lead to an enemy FS (the SU VRYAN model seemed to assume the opposite, illogically!); like German fear of Russian modernization in 1914 (or US fear that Cuba was getting Migs in 1961, or Chile (?), or supposedly the Communists in Indonesia were getting Chinese arms in 1965, or Guatemala in 1954...) (“attack now, better than later”).

Yet strategic warning is inevitably ambiguous: it may reflect an exercise, or a crisis unknown to you (Grenada for the US and UK), or enemy’s domestic politics (ABM, Carter build-up) or enemy’s response to his perceptions of your own actions (Reagan’s build-up?) rather than preparations for an intended imminent attack. And the consequences of a false alarm—though possibly better than those of a response to tactical warning—are still horrendous. (Though it may give the ONLY chance of “prevailing” in the war; just as decapitation may give the ONLY chance of “surviving.” (or at least, the only chance of coming off with no or “relatively light” (JCS: 10 million dead) damage.

But it was more than that in SU, as well as being more lightly armed, “filed down,” to reduce trigger pull weight, activate at a lighter touch (disturbance).

Note that “prevailing” is totally negated by nuclear winter—just as “surviving” is! Gorbachev undoubtedly saw that. Do either the Russian military (or Putin) or the US military realize that now?

Still, the appearance/threat that you may be crazy enough to believe that either damage-limitation or prevailing may be achievable by preemption (first-strike), can serve: a) to make your threats of FU in a regional conflict more credible (and both sides are relying on these in the Ukraine); and b) make the opponent more cautious in entering into any conflict, as in Syria. You’re not only highly armed (dangerously; DM) but “tough/crazy/irrational” perhaps in believing in the efficacy of your arms.

Saturday, December 12, 2015

54, Gorbachev’s urgency (first president not to have served in WWII) about reforms was to pull back from the brink of war, as seen by General Staff when he came in in March 84. INF treaty was seen by Staff as a success, removing P-11, as reducing the threat of war (which West dismissed as rhetorical exaggeration). Likewise, START-I

CFE Treaty started dissolution of Warsaw Pact and SU empire in East Europe: lopsided concessions by SU, starting with unilateral withdrawals not required by treaty. G. saw this as reassurance to West that SU desired to conquer West Europe (forward-based forces: [actually, to hold on to East].

Pry speculates that in trying to reduce chance of nuclear conflict, G. may have been more concerned about his own General Staff (preemption) than of the US. !!!

Pry: until the Eastern states withdrew, G had held on to the belief that communism enjoyed the support of the masses (and was in their best interest). After Warsaw Pact countries revolted, it was becoming clear that the USSR itself (Ukraine, Baltics, Caucasus, Central Asia...) was held together only by force.

Coup plotters feared that the Union Treaty (transforming the USSR into a condominium of republics?) would lead to dissolution of USSR: **and to Western invasion, taking advantage of weakness. Fundamental concern was the Western threat (like Andropov; Akhromeyev agreed.)** 61. **Kryuchov had believed for a decade that US and USSR were on the brink of Armageddon.** (Ideology had increased dangers of the nuclear era enormously (as in Fifties, for US!: SU and world domination): along with supposed "capability for preemption.")

This "made the 1991 coup a nuclear crisis" (again, unknown to the West: though Bush worried). Kryuchkov believed in inevitability of US-SU nuclear conflict. (Like LeMay! If so...) Co-founder of VRYAN with Andropov, he was And' protégé; for twenty years, focused on US nuclear threat. [AS IF LEMAY WERE IN CHARGE!] "Since 1980, Kry. had been the hair trigger of the Soviet nuclear strike forces."

Pry: The fear of imminent US attack remained alive throughout Gorbachev's reforms in the military and KGB; as shown in the continuation of VRYaN until at least November, 1991 (when Primakov claimed to shut it down in SVR, successor to KGB): but that didn't apply to GRU, which never officially abandoned it (Pry considers it probably survived in GRU, close to the General Staff, as of 1999, his book). STILL?

"The survival of VRYAN into the 1990s suggests that despite vastly improved relations between the US and USSR under Gorbachev, the General Staff and at least some civilian elites remained convinced that world war might **soon** be at hand and the nation had always to be ready to **interdict** a US **surprise** attack by launching a soviet **nuclear first strike**. The **danger inherent in crises as well as in normalcy**—even day-to-day relations between the sides involved some irritation, because of military movements and exercises—had a **higher octane level** than suspected by anyone in the West. " 63

{i.e., unknown to the West, the "balance" was considerably unstable, especially in crises but even in non-crisis (1983!): and the West wasn't concerned to reassure or deter or improve stability, watch its step, in these situations. LIKE NOW.

64 (Compare: JCS attitude to JFK leading to unraveling of NATO because of a public (or private!) trade of Turkish missiles [not only, giving up invasion of Cuba, forever: and foregoing the best possible chance (!) to invade Cuba!] What if he had made public deal on Sunday! That's how Gorbachev's policies leading to breakup of Warsaw pact looked to General Staff in 1989-90!

[So long as enemy surprise nuclear attack is seen as POSSIBLE; and preemption of it is seen as POSSIBLY (or probably) beneficial, preferable (to certainty or high probability

or even (Petrov) 50:50 likelihood of enemy surprise attack (“certainly less bad”) (POSSIBLY even “coming out even, or ahead, winning: with decapitation”):

this makes an enormous difference both to the interpretation of “evidence” (of enemy attack) (high in Reagan era, and now,

[Russian mobilization in support of Serbs in August (?) 1914 was extremely risky, and in fact, disastrous (given German attitude: “better war now than later” AND “we must not be second to mobilize and attack,” we must preempt preemption, we must strike second first, we cannot wait for actual attack to arrive” : like Soviets in 1981-83. (US SAC was unstable to false alarm in tactical warning; SU SAC was unstable both to false alarm in tac warning (Petrov, 1995) but to false alarm in strategic warning earlier (even more so: more advantageous to move, even on lower probability, more at stake: with tac warning, it’s almost too late to react (as US SAC knew, but couldn’t persuade president otherwise; although “it’s my policy,” by Lemay in 1956?)

How could either side see preemption, or surprise attack (by the other) as leading to anything but total catastrophe for their own country (plus...)? Answer (?): only a) hopes for decapitation; b) if you focus—as well, or mainly—on “prevailing,” in terms of post-attack military balance/capabilities (ignoring that you have no country to defend any more, and they have nothing left to be threatened, or to take over (either of you: in Europe), or to be blackmailed or urged to lend their resources to your rebuilding...)

(Picture end of WWII, with nuclear exchanges on both sides, with US “winning,” but with both continents destroyed!)

Why would US strike when USSR was on point of dissolving, weak, no Pact? Pry claims that coup plotters believed it a real danger! (True, VRYaN had always—irrationally—predicted this!)

Did General Staff believe in nuclear winter, or not? Gorbachev did. If they did, in 1991 (!) what use their preparations for war in August 19? 70

US fear if aSU surprise attack in Fifties was less destabilizing than SU fear in 1983 or Russian in 1991 or 1995, because the possibility of responding to (ambiguous, false, misleading) “evidence” that the other would attack, with actual preparations to preempt or retaliate (generating evidence to the other side of possible attack) was limited to one side, the US. The SU could not preempt, really (and the JCS knew this, by 1961 but really, probably, much earlier). But later, both sides COULD choose to preempt an attack; and the SU was planning to do this and was capable of it, as the US knew. A real TCS reciprocal fear situation, despite (the craziness of the SU readiness, in this era—matching US doctrinal and postural craziness: did USAF really believe this by then or not? Butler, even, acted in exercises as if he did—though he didn’t—because this was expected of him) the huge ability to retaliate (AJW’s second-strike capability WAS much greater than WWII, vastly greater, for both sides: YET...”it was not irrational to preempt,”

in terms of the doctrinal “rationality” of both sides, including “prevailing,” under Carter and Reagan.

Again, as under Reagan, there was not the slightest, remotest thought under GHWB, by anyone (right?) of striking first to exploit SU weakness! (What if civil war, nuclear war, had arisen in SU? What if US intervention was feared; or even, considered? What if threats by SU rebel forces to strike the US (“to prevent intervention—in support of Gorbachev?”) Premise of movie, submarines,

What if US had understood the fears and dangers in the SU then, and gone on alert? (As SU officers claimed: 73)

To Sagan: danger is not only going on alert, but false or mistaken claims that this has happened! In November, 1983; in August 1991 (73)...

Once on alert: pistols COCKED.

It was never true that one side had decided to launch a surprise attack imminently or soon. But US was **cocked** in C-II (and 1969!) And SU was in 1981-83, especially November, 1983; and in August 18-21, 1991! Pry 76.

(But see my earlier study of crises: one crisis or expected crisis cocks the system for the next one! (Lebanon-Grenada; Kuwait-Quemoy 1958; US cocked for invasion in October, 1962 (then given what JCS expected: SU missiles!); (without that, would JFK have been able to order a blockade within a week? Especially ,secretly?) (or been able to attack, as JCS wanted: could they have delivered what they urged, in attack or invasion?) ASK HERSHBERG

77. DEFCON 1 is ambiguous: is it preparation to retaliate, or to launch a surprise (or preemptive) attack?! False report of DEFCON 1 by GRU in Cuba in August 1991—could have led to SU preemption (sufficient signal that US was about to attack: not that, as it might have been (see Nixon 1969) intention to be ready to retaliate or preempt, if SU responded to US nuclear weapons in VN!

If this had been in 1981, instead of 1969, Nixon’s strategy would have been highly dangerous (and he might not, or would not, have known it). Why was it much less dangerous in 1969? SU not nearly so ready (four years after Brezhnev took tpower) to preempt? Less fear of US FS? (why?) (Nixon was building up MIRVs...) Is it true that SU didn’t respond to Nixon secret alert, at all? Didn’t they see it? [CHECK OR ASK BUR AND KIMBALL!] (READ PRY, as well as Fischer, et al! And SAGAN, Hellman, Benoit, (TCS!) Lynn Eden, Steve ... (Robock)

SRF forces all believed that US nuclear surprise attack ws a very real, if not imminent **possibility**. 85. No one was prosecuted for obeying Yazov’s order to go to Increased Combat Readiness. (See Nixon’s mysterious order for an alert in 1969) One of the few

that disobeyed, a Foxtrot sub that defied the Committee and broadcast support for gorbachov, was prosecuted for insubordination! 86

[Listen to and take Russian threats of risk of WWII seriously—as indicating both their real fears and expectations, and their possible readiness to preempt (preceded by cocking: destabilizing. See Sagan!

“

152-54 Briefcase control on length in R (too)
155 central to square 60 (not to stop: "Don't cut."
= PACOM 15)

157 Yeh

Humiliation, venturing (3 Aug '45) at collapse of USSR

165 R. from US would exhibit of public attack

167 93

20 increased security, instability

"one global move" (not recognized by US

R doesn't take...

no mass movement
or core

Half War efforts?!

frag?

Cyber?

1995: no R Agave crisis

after CW

no external conflict (not in Aug)

after Half War

185: Biggest challenge - avoid (by) the war.

(Peterson) What if 1-5 minutes? Was? EOP?

Result of these?

CMR?

JFK Assass.

[of Hiroshima MLPTT

C-II Mptt:

(Tobacco

VN MYTH

China

1950-75
45

SDI

rec. winter IRAQ?

AFGHAN?

("Comparing History")

PDS - C/A is not "rogue"

- it responds to

Wall St. / Deep State

(not off on its own)

201
Mythos: 2008
from - from

"General Hunt Ho"

"Handshaking Hunt Ho"

(Somencher Avenue)

KIEV COUP!

- CI Myth!
- US / Free World /
pro-democracy in
TW?
- Rational actor model
- IMF austerity / structural
adjustment

MYTH OF "PURE COMP"
(Economic

Miller & Friedman '53

(see Krugman, NYRB

Dec. 17, 15)

Henry Dwyer White:

misrepresents SO in

New Deal world

international order

(like Hiss): back to be

inter-national.

Notes on PRY, "War Game 1983"

186 (1992: Kalamir US as "the enemy" (see panels)

to R, still?

More war (imperial attack? US/R etc.?)
on "possible"

AWW to me, RAND → CF
concern

using, definitely on R "weakness"! Choo!
(AWW) "writes"

danger of "Glasnost"! (with arms! Iraq! Syria!
Pakistan!

210 New Power = Great Power = must be mutually
consulted in regard/resolution of conflicts,
as in Bosnia, 1994

Or Syria! 2015

"World war" — as if this did not even
"abstract level."

206

Western intervention; R EU; exercises both sides
(APT level as in D.S.)

Amplification of a DM

or? CNW? C-II?

1'
Danger of Russian (imperial) FS war, after
"end of CIV" [in imminent Russian collapse!]

(12-16-15 5:45 PM)

242. Russian plan (of NATO (not, how?)
US

275
"search for an
answer"

P.G.

Political kind

TCS

imperial attack

civil war (confus)

— interventions

(Not a choice to offer
war [rather, war, professional
means, cult = imperialism, D-2?]

(- being designated, obs-expected
not a Great Power
(imperial war - war
+ war force)

2) desire to be a Great Power

(fear that US promotion of R unstable will lead
to imperial attack! INTERNAL INSTABILITY / COUP / REGIME

3) Threaten of frustration (of imperial attack,
of disintegration

273 (4) If see strat. balance
as moving unstable

AUN was right about

EU/R possible intentions

to attack (after the oppression)

[see now: Memorandum

Part of USSR)

was right! Give frustration

cult: members = USAF

("not just USAF")

BUT misdiagnose / wrong

on how to prevent / deter /

avoid that

[give US deliberate FS
threat.

FS threat was not

misdiagnosed, careless, the getting
wrong on "reaction" to imperial
attack

Det-5

was not be and)

or main, or initial,

ACM of SAC

(not only

ACM, USAF / SAC)

SO IT IS!

(Was Strat Com?

"members" as good
PSYOPS. --?

(Should be,
w. current position,
2nd strategic?)

278

(5) R moving for war

as is SAC!

241

2

~~242~~ Perry & others warning: "no R. threat."
no danger of industrial launch. (Pamphlet?)
(US?)

Why (2) can (Pam) believe US may attack the
(without without false too soon)

and (b)

1995

1993 Petrov

new R3

coups

US officials are right to demand US from
of R attack, to believe

243

— but not to discount risk there,
and take steps to reduce it...

(no. NATO expansion!

BMD!

"disrupt"

Blair

245 Universality of R warning

Network — and this machine

new weapons

MM Exhibit

and an
promotion
of that
machine

to prompt — on the most
serious/dangerous threat to the
US + world!

Fear/suspicion/hostility is distorting — to
both sides. Yet fears on both sides ^{are realistic}, as well
as dangers.

1) break tendencies in both

2) the future (political balance) within each

and 3) conflict is imminent danger of both (+ challenges)

US FOR

We have to hear — the other's fears, as well as ours (and the
effort of one, and an understanding on the other's! "

Pay now to be — anti-Sov "R is an enemy" 247

yes — can?

anti-START Chap. 32, 33

(What does he want, Prophet?)

as well as awareness...

R is a threat (even) though not an enemy

(~~can~~ though R kind —

and maybe Putin — do see

US/Wall St/SAC as an enemy?)

247

What does Putin have?

collapse of USSR as "tragedy"?

["R was right in C-II" (strong basis?)

RAC-007 was as intel probe, 9 Apr 95

1995 rocket was military?

(Yugoslavia?)

Half War?

Drug? ---

"US as hostile to R

who would denature

[R FU? US FU? Pumpkin?

Surprise attack — when R is weak...?]

Holmes was always right - in int. politics

(cf. Ron Paul)
but that doesn't mean his views
prevail in Russia now (in int.) or today
(Putin? Med.?)

or in US?

So balance (is) unstable (it wasn't, in 1960-61 -
and even so, may come to even)

It was, in '80's (post-disturbance)

(JFK - American Univ. FTB - Nov '63)

1968
LBJ: Goldstone (last, Cypres '68)
N - (!) 1972, -)

and '90's: (compro; 1995;

Disbalance (large profoundly misjudged) WWII
is "possible"

(I'm though - I thought -

From R - more likely

than from US: and the

won't give up modern

(and will DSAE/Ring -

I was more focused on

the - the world,

unilaterally:

R won't at all (?) in face

of US superiority...

it took a major test and

balance alone, (or US FU was.

SU ally - NOT, since end of CW]

UK...?

I saw: danger of US FU in

Only War (war) is long (possible)

or from (China)

- not WWII

250 We see R "aggression" in China & US.

2 Russia see NATO expansion; K's comp;
K's attack in east! ^{was in} ~~positive~~ ^{negative} ~~intention~~ (K's?)

Yeltsin, 1995, 98. ("would over") = C-II'
sharp change

252 Her. B.
"New and novel" 1990 It's done!
if NATO expands

P then critiques (?) or does he?

251 98 BY warn of possible "would over"
if US follows through on unilateral lines to
Army: (AC and!)

(Opposition to NATO expansion = to P-II (AA&B))
to test (right!)

252 Kosovo — "VN" — WWII!

US offer to "dominate the world"

252 (there: my '99, opposition

from R, C, India, Yugo, Arms, Cuba, Belgium

US/NATO-led aggression in Yugo."

yes!

"reduce R to a second-rate power."

'99 Russia want strong aid; they lead (USSR.)
been was, attack

But they wouldn't

give up Army —

just as R wouldn't

give up SD

R - New look - SO's = my base, 1959-60? 265
(Parish says yes!)

So - how "re-educate"?

Change pol. context!

266 Charges for eco- pressure R to maintain
its SRF! + exercise it!

No attention by Prg to new context:

by R General staff?!

(by SAC?!)

268 too near 10,000

275 - Conflict between US/NATO plans ~~for~~ and Russian's
for "former USSR" - "Russian sphere of influence"
(CIS integration): incl. Eastern Ukraine
(with Western UK, (Baltic) Moldavia,
like SU-Chinese relations 1944-91."

see Linky about to intervene in May 1992
in Armenia - Azerbaijan conflict
[NOW: Syria-Turkey!]

276 opposes Baltic into NATO
(US/NATO ignores R. protest, appointing
"internals" :)

276 1998 UK + Black Sea Fleet / Crimia Can Syria ban.
What will US do for this, if Armed
geo?

not RAYD (=HK) (Bluff)

278

FS forms of US blowing / Europe [SU, R news: maybe
not bluff!]

Obligation retinal control
(not Prio)

Fear of SU surprise
attack + prediction

FU thinks

COOM,
here,
writing

(not a disagreement between)

SU and others; but US
attacks (Berlin)

Prediction

SU/R: not permitted
premised
on explicit basis

ignoring: Europe cos. (Vost
(west) colateral)

started

here Winter

K and VEK accepted (us. anims) there must be

no armed conflict

risk of war

only VA (military action)

is too great (as if convergence of
agencies and conflict is — loss of

up effort (y. death!)

There must not be war: We can't must avoid it
(if whether concessions).

Baron Have Russian military since Andropov (late
Engel)

(Was K at all worried about US surprise attack?)

By the, or VEK? Were SU military? If didn't do much
to detour it — explicit bluff! (Which might have caused

US prediction!

1/2 no. JFK in ~~1962~~ 1962? (M, JFK, McN... from of blatant
Annapolis, 1980?

When did have first really plan on prompt?

Not (?) dis det with MIRV...

Coping, PVP says: If always thinks of
WWIII as something that might not be able
to reduce event

(RAND in '80s = SU in 80's, 90's...)

278: 1995 - believe possible US attack

(cast give a note reaction to 1 man...)

Can we tell R - we wouldn't strike first

under any circumstances - because

(as JFK!)

and we aren't hoping for it!

(Must we maintain threat / bluff / "pretense")

(that we believe it could be realized -

as AW said: (for SU - "unless")
we...

now

280

281

282

Do we want + "have" to keep R maintain as to

how we would react to conflict on R

simply / "open" or an immediate reaction

(like SU in Greece) (as Berlin) -

us. "non-violent response"

Subj, exercises w. Russia

281 PVP vs. US exercises over R simply

Must US/NATO oppose a Russian "sphere"?

(con-ly-sure)

with small ~~few~~ exercises

- NATO membership?

(NATO sphere)
US

Cf. R in Mexico, C.A.!

289: Does Prg know of US FU threat?

1969? What?! (Born)

290 CW was more dangerous than US knew.

PVP: Collapse of Pact + USSR " " " !

291 expansion to Baltic states = C-II'

(But not yet - however, it's like West Berlin -

one corner, one exposed territory

1997 NATO expansion = CW: "Not over"

CW-III?

tripartite

not one

"What"

Hyp: R (Pact) does / did look to

reconstitute USSR in large part,

by proposed means: Union

+ NATO whenever better

Gogger

Pravica

Pact

1) Wgata that; and 2) Russia has
(of entireties, dismissing Russia!)

PVP doesn't
say this